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Workshop: The Economics of Strategic Communication and Persuasion


Saturday 28 Oct 2017
From 8:15AM To 6PM

Organized by CIRANO, CIREQ and CIRPÉE


Organizers: Ming Li (Concordia University, CIREQ, CIRANO), Arianna Degan (Université du Québec à Montréal), Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Pittsburgh and Kyiv School of Economics) and Huan Xie (Concordia University, CIREQ,CIRANO)


Many economic and social situations feature a divergence between information and decision-making power. In such situations, the informed party may, through a variety of channels and methods, convey information to the uninformed party, so as to influence the latter’s decision. In recent decades, economics has turned its attention to formal analysis of strategic communication and persuasion. The focus is on the limits and potentials of communication and persuasion, as well as ways to enhance them so as to improve information transmission and decision-making. This year’s program included both theory and experiments, with considerable focus on the application to the conduct of scientific research and its influence of public policy.

Odilon Camara

Odilon Camara is Associate Professor at the University of Southern California.

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Chris Cotton

Chris Cotton is Professor in the Department of Economics at Queen's University.

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Deniz Dizdar

Deniz Dizdar is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at the Université de Montréal.

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Guillaume Fréchette

A CIRANO Associate Researcher and Fellow since 2005, Guillaume Fréchette is Professor in the Department of Economics at New York University.

Holding a Ph.D. in Economics from Ohio State University, his research interests revolve around the testing of economic models, mostly having to do with  industrial organization and political economy. This has led him to work on bargaining and infinitely repeated games.

He was trained under John H. Kagel at Ohio State University and then Alvin E. Roth at Harvard University. The bulk of his work uses data from laboratory experiment, although some of his work uses field data.

His work on bargaining started with Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules co-authored with John H. Kagel and Steven F. Lehrer which came out in the American Political Science Review. This paper reports results from an experiment testing the comparative static predictions between two amendment rules of a central model in the theory of legislative bargaining du to Baron and Ferejohn (1989). This was followed by many experiments testing other predictions of the model as well as related models and led to publications in Econometrica as well as other field journals.

He has completed two projects on infinitely repeated games. The first one (with Masaki Aoyagi) explored in the laboratory whether subjects could understand how to use a noisy public signal to sustain cooperative outcomes. In the second one, with Pedro Dal Bó, the laboratory is used to study the factors that may affect coordination in an infinitely repeated game.

Beside these two main lines of research, he has also studied bargaining over networks, establish empirical evidence of costly unraveling in a market, studied the parity law in France, as well as other topics.

Recently he has been working on issues relating to experimental methods as well as the role of language in conveying numerical concepts and advice.

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Maxim Ivanov

Maxim Ivanov is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at McMaster University.

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René Kirkgaard

René Kirkgaard is Professor in the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Guelph.

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Shih En Lu

Shih En Lu is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Simon Fraser University.

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Quyen Nguyen

Quyen Nguyen is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics and Finance at Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, Utah State University.

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Peter Norman Sørensen

Peter Norman Sørensen is Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

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Radovan Vadovič

Radovan Vadovič is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Carleton University.

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Huan Xie

A CIRANO Researcher and Fellow since 2008, Huan Xie is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Concordia University.

Holding a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh, she specializes in microeconomics, experimental economics, game theory and public finance.

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Andy Zapechelnyuk

Andy Zapechelnyuk is Professor at the University of St Andrews.

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8:15 - 9:00
Registration and Breakfast
9:00 - 10:00
Strategic sample selection
Peter Norman Sørensen, René Kirkgaard
10:00 - 10:30
Coffee Break
10:30 - 11:30
Rules and commitment in communication
Guillaume Fréchette, Radovan Vadovič
11:30 - 12:30
On the connection between persuasion and delegation
Andy Zapechelnyuk, Deniz Dizdar
12:30 - 14:00
14:00 - 15:00
Persuasion bias in scientific research: An experiment
Huan Xie, Chris Cotton
15:00 - 16:00
Bayesian persuasion: Evidence from the laboratory
Quyen Nguyen, Shih En Lu
16:00 - 16:30
Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30
On the value of persuasion by experts
Odilon Camara, Maxim Ivanov
17:30 - 17:45
17:45 - 18:30
Roundtable discussion
19:30 - 21:00
Conference Dinner


1130 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest, Montréal, QC H3A 2M8, Canada