This paper explores the Canadian context of workers' compensation (WC) by replicating, with Canadian data, a study carried out by Butler and Worrall (1991). These authors were the first to develop a simple model to separate claims reporting and risk bearing moral hazard in WC. Risk bearing moral hazard reflects the workers' incentive to carry more risk and consequently experience more accidents when benefits rise, while claims reporting moral hazard mirrors workers' incentive to file a claim. The estimation of these two moral hazard effects leads to results quite different with Canadian data than with American data.

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