We experimentally test the ability of subjects to identify repeated-game strategies from prisoner's dilemma choice data. In the experiments, subjects use a finite state grammar to build models to fit game histories. The histories are designed to distinguish between strategies with empirical and theoretical validity. We find that subjects successfully identify unconditional, punishment, and counting strategies. When data are observationally equivalent among different strategies, punishment strategies tend to be inferred. When inferred strategies do not fit the data, they tend to be more complex than necessary and to contain positive reciprocity and forgiveness. Our experiment provides an empirical basis for repeated-game strategies and sheds new light on play in repeated games.

Voir le document

Dernières publications

2017RP-03 RP
La surqualification professionnelle chez les diplômés des collèges et des universités : État de la situation au Québec
Brahim Boudarbat et Claude Montmarquette
Voir le document

2017s-11 CS
The social cost of contestable benefits
Arye Hillman et Ngo Van Long
Voir le document

2017s-09 CS
Fiscal Surprises at the FOMC
Dean Croushore et Simon van Norden
Voir le document

2017MO-04 MO
Méthodes avancées d’évaluation d’investissements / Advanced Methods of Investment Evaluation - Tome 2
Marcel Boyer
Voir le document

2017MO-03 MO
Méthodes avancées d’évaluation d’investissements / Advanced Methods of Investment Evaluation - Tome 1
Marcel Boyer
Voir le document


Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations
1130 rue Sherbrooke Ouest, suite 1400
Montréal, Québec (Canada) H3A 2M8
(514) 985-4000
(514) 985-4039
reception@cirano.qc.ca

© 2017 CIRANO. Tous droits réservés.



Partenaire de :